Introduction
The European Union is the world's largest aid donor to developing countries purportedly spending 500 million euros per month on assistance projects that span the globe from its neighbors, to the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Collectively, EU Member States and the European Commission provide more than half of all official development aid and yet there has been only scant attention paid to this area of EU policy. The vast majority of scholarship on the EU's external relations tends to focus primarily on the construction (and often the weaknesses) of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), but both development aid and humanitarian assistance represent a significant area of EU external action. As this paper seeks to illustrate, the existing scholarship misses an important dimension of European power and influence in the world by neglecting its role in foreign aid and development. Both internally and externally the EU has undergone a major transformation in the way conducts its development policies. Internally, the European Parliament has recently offered a strong critique of this policy area and as a result, attempts are being made to close the gap between rhetoric and reality by offering a more coherent vision of development that is based on partnership with the receiving countries and by improving the quality and efficiency of the various funding instruments and designing new mechanisms to work more closely with each country and their own particular strategies to reduce poverty. I argue that this capacity for reflexivity and policy change derives from and affirms its unique nature as a normative power in world politics.
Externally, the EU has projected its norms and values by emphasizing the humanitarian and civilian nature of its external relations and linking its development policies to the broader aims of promoting fundamental freedoms, consolidating democracy and strengthening the respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EU has demonstrated significant collective leadership and commitment to the UN Millennium Development Goals and in May 2001, for the first time, the EU hosted a major United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. While these examples may be mostly symbolic, this paper will attempt to offer a more systematic investigation of whether or not the EU's record on development constitutes an area of external policy that approximates Manners' formulation of the EU's international identity as one of a normative power. Examining both the normative discourse and specific policy actions allows a more comprehensive answer to the following question: Is the EU approach to development consistent with its values and norms as well as effective and beneficial to the goals of development and global poverty reduction? A normatively grounded, empirically supported answer to this question may have significant implications for the theoretical debates regarding the usefulness of the concept of 'Normative Power Europe' as well as policy debates and strategies for combating global poverty and growing inequality between the North and South.
The European Union and the North-South Economic Divide
Well over three decades have passed since the Pearson Commission proclaimed the widening gap between the developed and developing countries to be the 'central problem of our times.' Today global inequalities in income and standards of living have reached obscene proportions. The following stylized facts presented by Timothy Garton Ash capture the scope of the divide between the 'rich North' and the 'poor South.'
In round figures, roughly 1 billion of the world's 6 billion inhabitants are rich. They have an average income of approximately $70 a day. They live mainly in Europe, North America, Japan, and a few other prosperous countries. In the mental geography of development rather than geopolitics, the West of the free is the "North" of the rich. (Thus Australia, though in the Southern hemisphere, is part of the "North.") At the other end, in the poor "South," more than 1 billion men, women, and children live on less than $1 a day. Only slightly better off are another 1 to 2 billion people living on less than $2 a day. According to U.N. figures, between 1999 and 2001, some 840 million people went hungry; one in every seven people in the world. At the same time, nearly one-third of Americans suffer from the serious health problem of obesity. Who needs a parable? In the South, men women, and children are dying because they don't have enough to eat; in the North, they are dying because they eat too much (2004: 149) .
Extremes in private, individual wealth accumulation is further illustration of the inequities and the fundamental distributive malfunctioning of the global economic system. In 1999, it was estimated that the assets of the world's three richest people, Bill
Gates, Warren Buffet and Paul Allen, "exceeded the total annual gross national product of all the world's least developed countries with a combined population of some 600 million (Ash 2004: 150) . The tough questions arising from comparisons such as these is whether or not the driving factors behind such explosive wealth accumulation among certain individuals and in specific regions are inherently related to increasing impoverishment elsewhere in the world? In other words, is what makes the rich richer also making the poor poorer? Though I do not attempt to answer such a complex, ageold question here, attention to the growing divide and the attempt to establish how the North's foreign economic practices and development policies may be contributing to it, is an important first-step. To conclude this overview of the basic facts of the North-South divide and the economic weight of the European Union, it is important to underscore the extreme concentration of wealth. To refer again to the famous 1992 HDR champagne coupe, onefifth of the planet's population controls almost 85 % of the world's economic activity and wealth. In addition to the world trade flows that are significantly North-North, Boyer and
Drache have presented evidence indicating roughly 85 % of foreign investment flow is between the industrial core of Europe, North America and Japan (1996: 2). Now, we will turn to how the EU has addressed this situation both in rhetoric and policy discourse as well as actual trade and aid policies.
Discourse and Development Policies in the European Union
The effort to precisely and explicitly define a common European identity has proved quite elusive to say the least and the problem is even more challenging when speaking about an EU foreign policy identity. Obviously the EU is a single actor when it comes to trade policies as the 27 members negotiate as a single bloc within the World
Trade Organization, but a coordinated multilateral trade policy has not prevented the individual member states from having bilateral relations with other countries of both the North and the South. Furthermore, the emphasis here is on both trade as well as development policies such as aid and humanitarian assistance where the EU does not exercise exclusive EU competence as of yet. For this examination of normative discourse, however, it is critical to identify how development policy fits into EU external relations and what the EU has projected as their common policy goals in this area. When we examine some of the empirical data it will be necessary to disaggregate the member states from the EU as some of the data are necessarily based on the individual policies as opposed to a common EU policy.
Ian Manners (2002) has argued that the EU is a unique entity whose identity in world politics is based on normative, ideational values that transcend narrow national interests-whether civilian or military. The EU's approach to development may be an important confirmation of this conceptualization of "normative power Europe" as well as a significant pillar of the EU's external policy. Whereas bilateral aid policies of each Member State may still be associated with elements of national interest that are pursued through forms of economic blackmail and political coercion, collectively the EU is much less susceptible to such charges. For instance, the most recent OECD report that scrutinized EU development policies, did not make any such accusations, though they did not fail to mention that Commission aid practices are slow, bureaucratic and incompetent-though improving.
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The very fact that an international organization like the OECD is assessing the EU's collective effort at development policies indicates this is an area that warrants greater analysis by scholars interested in exploring various forms of the EU's international 'actorness.' What is particularly compelling about the need to more carefully consider the EU as an actor in the field of international development is the opportunity to evaluate both the normative and empirical dimensions of its commitments.
Addressing the critique of Diez (2005) (2006, 168) . Development assistance appears to be a
solid case for what the EU should be doing as it also serves as a strategy for promoting the norms and values of international cooperation, human security, and sustainable development beyond its own borders. An examination of another concept that has been used to characterize the nature of the EU as it engages in world politics will lend further support to my attempt to apply Manners' construction to the EU's development policies.
As Calypso Nicolaidis notes, Europeans know all too well the significance of power in world affairs and the EU increasingly represents and shapes Europe's role in the world. She goes on to claim that: "The rest of the world, far from being Hobbesian is attuned to the European choice because both power and purpose matter in international relations; legitimacy translates power into effectiveness. In such a world, the promise held up by the "European difference" is great and lies in the legitimacy of the narrative of projection that the European Union seeks to deploy that is the consistency between its internal and external praxis and discourse. EU-topia is relevant beyond the shores of its own paradise" (Nicolaidis: 2005: 96) . This narrative of projection conceptualization appears to be congruent with the "normative Europe" perspective and helps us to make sense of the EU's complex, ever evolving, identity as a global actor.
In direct relation to how this narrative of projection image help us to theorize the EU's legitimacy and capacity to act collectively in the area of development policy and relations with the South, it is significant to consider the following argument made by Nicolaidis:
How can its narrative of projection be reconciled with the post colonial character pf the EU project? In part by systematically banishing the kind of dual standards that underpinned colonialist thinking....The European Community both inherited the postcolonial guilt of its member states and provided an institutional venue to assuage that guilt, a venue that would be less vulnerable to accusations of neocolonialism than individual member states' diplomacy (Nicolaidis 2005: 101).
For Nicolaidis, this narrative of projection requires that Europe--and presumably scholars seeking to understand EU foreign policy identity in these terms--define power as "the capacity to empower others" (p. 114). In defending this view of power, Nicolaidis points out that while the U.S. may outspend the EU on the military by factor of 4, the EU and member states combined outspend US on development aid by factor of 7 2 .
Thus, I would argue that this is a felicitous way to examine the question of EU policies In 2005 the European Commission issued its latest statement regarding the reinvigorated commitment and the collective or 'community' approach to development.
The following four fundamental concepts define the EU's new development policy:
• Harmonization: Seeks to harmonize aid procedures with other donors and partner countries
• Results-orientation: Evaluates success in terms of concrete achievements not inputs and particularly those measured against the
UN Millennium Development Goals
• Ownership: Aligns EU aid with the national budget process and its implementation mechanisms. Encourages recipient countries to "take ownership" of the assistance program.
• What is most striking about these concepts underlying the EU's development policy (in addition to succinctness, which is altogether rare for any EU policy) is that two of the four principles imply the alignment of the EU's values with those of the United Nations and more specifically, the UN Millennium Development Goals. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not the discourse is consistent with the actual practice and policy commitments, which we will evaluate in a subsequent section.
It is interesting to note that Europeans are fully cognizant and supportive of the leading role their societies play in development assistance. Europeans now provide more than 50 % of all civilian development assistance in the world and 47 % of humanitarian assistance in the world (Rifkin 2004: 304-305) . The trend to move foreign aid policy under the purview of the EU, thus to the supranational as opposed to the national level, seems to make sense given the gradual coordination of more foreign economic and commercial policies. Though there may remain difficult issues to resolve regarding further enlargement, protecting cultural identities, and the harmonization of immigration and taxation policies, European citizens show firm support for a growing European foreign policy identity of which an important pillar is strengthening humanitarian and development assistance.
Empirical Evidence of Congruence between Discourse and Policy
The Doha Development Round 
EU undertakings
Presently, the European Union (Commission + Member States) accounts for 55% of world aid. As President Barroso has publicly stated: " to achieve the MDGs, it is necessary "to do more, better and faster. The European Commission has made and will make proposals to strengthen the level of ambition and to consolidate its world leadership Unlike other aspects of external relations, this policy area does not require a significant loss of national sovereignty but rather a shifting of resources from national to community level efforts.
Commitment to Development Index
It is not just the amount but the quality of the assistance that matters for producing positive change in economic development. The Center for Global Development and investigations that link both aid and trade practices would be needed to fully substantiate the claim that overall the EU acts in a consistent and normatively principled way when it comes to its vision and implementation of development policies.
Conclusion
The paper has sought an empirical validation of the concept of Normative Power
Europe by examining one often neglected area of the EU's external relations:
development policy. The question set forth at the beginning of this paper was whether or not the EU approach to development is consistent with its values and norms as well as effective and beneficial to the goals of development and global poverty reduction. With the exception of two areas, the need for greater efficiency in aid delivery and new trade assistance measures, overall the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a tentative affirmation of the congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the execution of its development policies.
The Europeans have undergone self-critique and concrete reform, by virtue of gradually transferring development policies to the supranational level away from the temptations and perils of pursuing narrow national interests that may come at the expense of the broader interest of sustainable human development consistent with the values enshrined in the EU's founding treaties. Though these changes are still incremental and incomplete, the energy and commitment shown by the Directorate-General for Development and the growing interest and involvement of the European Parliament bode well for greater coherence and oversight which should produce more efficient and effective development policies in the near future.
As Maxwell and Riddell (1998) point out the European model of development is explicitly couched in terms of "partnership". Partnership denotes equity and cooperation (Lister 2003) , which directly challenges the notion of hierarchy. The 2000 Cotonou
Partnership Agreement (and its predecessors) with 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries is a prime example, combining aid, trade, and political dialogue. Interregionalism denotes agreement between distinct but equal regions based on promotion of good government and development through dialogue going beyond economic governance to embrace political and institutional reform and social inclusion. In this regard, EU aid is tied to institutional reforms and the recipient country's own long-term development goals and achievements. Thus, the EU sees ownership by EU partner countries as pivotal for the efficiency and sustainability of its initiatives. At the same time this strategy seeks a discursive mediation of inequalities between Europe and the South.
From this perspective it is arguably the case that EU development policies represent the normative form and the empirical function of the theoretical concept as well as the practice of a "Normative Power Europe."
